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Introduction 
According to some, the economic crisis of the mid 1970s marked the 
transition from the traditional Fordist mode of industrial organization to 
one of Time-Based-Competition (Schoenberger, 1997; Stalk, 1988; Stalk 
and Hout, 1990). As an industrial paradigm, the 'old', ideal-type, Fordism 
was a system of 'assembly-line-based mass production' of standardized 
goods (Asheim, 1992). Production took place in large vertically integrated 
plants owned and centrally controlled by large, often multinational, 
corporations. Rising productivity was based on mechanization, the 
pursuit of internal economies of scale, a detailed division of tasks and 
work intensification (Amin, 1994). Long production runs and dedicated 
machinery were intended to minimize downtime. Driven by similar 
considerations, suppliers produced and delivered standardized 
components in large, infrequent, batches. Price competitiveness was the 
single most important criterion in supplier-selection (Sayer, 1986). 
Finally, as regards the geography of production, the narrow focus on 
price, production costs and labor cost minimization meant that the 
Fordist system was often characterized by an extreme spatial division of 
labor and spaced-out supply chains. Peripheral regions were incorporated 
in a dependent way through branch-plant investment that contributed 
little to regional development.  
  
The Fordist methods of work organization had reached their limits in 
terms of productivity growth by the 1970s. Furthermore, due to its 
inherent rigidities, the Fordist system was unable to cater for modern 
markets, characterized by a demand for variety, quality and 
responsiveness and by shorter product life cycles. For these reasons, 
among others, the economic crisis of the mid-1970s has been interpreted 
as a 'crisis of Fordism' (Amin, 1994; Schoenberger, 1997). One idea is 
that a resolution of this crisis, if possible at all, requires a return to a 
more flexible, craft-based mode of production1. 
 
Others point at many firms that are successfully competing in the new 
market environment with new flexible forms of high volume production 
that are blurring the distinction between craft and mass production 
1 See, for example, Piore and Sabel (1984) on ‘flexible specialization’ and Storper and Scott 
(1989) on ‘flexible accumulation’. 
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(Jessop, 1992; Tomaney, 1994). These firms are not producing 
standardized end-products but instead have succeeded in combining mass 
production with product variety and customization. All new high volume 
production firms, in one way or another, "combine the benefits of 
economies of scope and greater flexibility in responding to consumer 
demand, which are characteristic of small batch production, with those of 
economies of scale, characteristic of mass production" (Hudson, 1997b, 
p. 303). These ideas are captured in a number of production concepts, 
including Lean Production (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990), Mass 
Customisation (Pine, 1993), Dynamic Flexibility (Coriat, 1991, Veltz, 
1991), Diversified Quality Production (Jessop, 1992) and Time-Based-
Competition (Stalk and Hout, 1990; Schoenberger, 1997).  
 
The Time-Based-Competition (TBC) model emphasizes the fact that the 
new competitive environment and the requirements of modern markets 
have drastically changed the role of time in competition. According to 
the proponents of the model, firms now compete primarily on the basis 
of their ability to compress time in all elements of the value chain and, 
beyond that, in the firms' relations with upstream and downstream 
partners. The central focus is on reducing product development times 
and order-to-delivery cycles. This, in theory, results in a highly flexible 
production system that offers a combination of fast response, increased 
variety, high value and low cost (Stalk and Hout, 1990). 
 
Schoenberger (1997) postulates that the rise of TBC will have 
repercussions for the geography of production and regional development. 
She depicts a stylized scenario of 'concentrated deconcentration' where 
the multinational firm creates tightly integrated production complexes in 
each of its primary market regions, including, for example, North 
America, the European Union, East Asia and Southeast Asia. The 
regional complexes would include various manufacturing functions as 
well as some degree of technical and strategic responsibility which would 
allow the firm to respond to particular needs of the individual regional 
markets.  
 
She also postulates that TBC will lead towards a greater proximity 
between buyers and their suppliers and an increase in local and regional 
production linkages. The argument basically involves two buyer-supplier 
proximity drivers: efficient technical information exchange and efficient 
product flow or logistical efficiency. As regards efficient product flow, 
one of the central targets of TBC is a reduction of the order-to-delivery 
cycles or chain cycle times (Stalk and Hout, 1990). Towards this end TBC 
envelopes the Just-In-Time (JIT) production and supply principles which 
are expected to lead towards close buyer-supplier proximity. 
 
The relevance of these ideas was tested in a case study of the 
microcomputer hardware industry in Ireland and Scotland. The 
microcomputer industry is here defined as the industry producing 
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personal computers (including laptops and notebooks), workstations and 
entry-level servers costing less than $100,000 in 2001. It involves both 
microcomputer assemblers and the manufacturers of components and 
parts. Companies in this industry have been portrayed as prime examples 
of TBC and JIT supply (Hudson, 1997; International Business Week, 3 
November 1983 and 14 May 1984; Sayer, 1986). The microcomputer 
sector is a good example of an industry facing highly volatile markets and 
irregular and unpredictable demand - characteristics that will prove to be 
central to the analysis later in this paper. The findings concerning the 
relevance of the first driver, efficient technical information exchange, 
have been documented elsewhere (van Egeraat, 2002; van Egeraat, 
Jacobson, and Phelps, 2002). This article will focus on how the logistical 
considerations have influenced the geography of production linkages in 
the industry. Related studies on the industry (e.g. Angel and Engstrom, 
1995; Dedrick and Kraemer, 2002) tend to focus on the geography of 
production networks in the USA and/or the Far East. Our study 
specifically focused on the production networks of companies located in 
the European semi-periphery. Furthermore, Angel and Engstrom 
analyzed the role of technical information exchange and paid no attention 
to logistical considerations. 
  
This article focuses strongly on the relevance of the efficiency argument 
for buyer-supplier proximity. Less attention is paid to other aspects of 
buyer-supplier relationships, notably a shift from producer-driven to 
buyer-driven commodity chains (Gereffi, 2001) or from supplier to client 
markets and the associated shift of relative power among chain members. 
Whether governance mechanisms in the microcomputer hardware 
industry are really shifting towards buyer-driven chains is a matter for 
debate (see, for example, Chen, 2002). Nevertheless, power-relations in 
general could have a confounding effect on the analysis of logistical 
arrangements and their influence will therefore receive attention as well. 
 
Most data were collected during interviews with general managers, 
materials managers and logistics managers employed by the 11 branded 
microcomputer makers located in Ireland (Apple, AST, Dell, Gateway 
and Intel) and Scotland (Apricot-Mitsubishi, Compaq, Digital, IBM, 
Packard Bell-NEC and Sun Microsystems) - from here on referred to as 
'the focal companies' or 'the focal plants'. Three rounds of semi-
structured and structured interviews were conducted in the period 1998-
2001. Unless stated otherwise, all data presented in this article pertain to 
the situation during the period 1998 to early 1999. Additional data were 
collected via postal questionnaires completed by staff at the focal 
companies and newspaper research. Finally, telephone interviews were 
conducted with staff at a selection of local supplier firms. 
 
The next section will more closely examine the logic underlying the idea 
that logistical considerations in the context of TBC will drive close buyer-
supplier proximity. This is followed by an outline of the geography of the 
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supply chains of the microcomputer companies in Ireland and Scotland. 
It will be shown that the focal companies source the vast majority of 
material inputs from regions outside Ireland and Britain, notably from 
the Far East. The next section provides an insight into the way the focal 
companies structured their inbound logistics pipelines. This provides the 
basis for the subsequent analysis of data on inventory levels, shipment 
frequencies and modes of transport. We focus on the question whether 
the focal companies are still operating sub-optimal inbound logistics 
system organized on traditional Fordist, Mass Production, principles, or 
whether, in line with TBC, the focal companies have optimal (or at least 
less sub-optimal)2 inbound logistics systems that take full account of the 
modern comprehensive logistics management principles underlying TBC.  
If the latter is the case, then we will have to conclude that these 
principles do not necessarily lead to buyer-supplier proximity. In the 
conclusion we consider the implications of this for industrial policy. 
 
Comprehensive logistics management principles 
One of the central components of Time Based Competition is JIT 
supply. Textbook 'true JIT' (Morris, 1989; Morris, 1992), 'full JIT' (Mair, 
1992), or 'pure JIT' (Fawcett and Birou, 1992) is a logistics system 
characterized by very low buffer inventories, near synchronous 
production and delivery of inputs on a daily basis 3  directly to the 
assembly line. The term sequential JIT has been used for situations where 
suppliers manufacture and deliver components in the same order as they 
are used at the assembly lines of their customers (Larsson, 2000). Such 
systems are believed to lead to close buyer-supplier proximity (Estall, 
1985; Kenney and Florida, 1992; Mair, 1992; Mair, Florida, and Kenney, 
1988; Sayer, 1986; Schoenberger, 1997). True JIT is often presented as 
the optimal supply system. However, true JIT supply should really be 
interpreted as an extreme outcome in a spectrum of possible optimal 
outcomes based on modern comprehensive logistics management 
principles. The explanation requires a closer look at the comprehensive 
logistics management principles underlying JIT supply. 
 
Logistics management systems have always involved calculating the 
minimum required component inventory levels and related individual 
order quantities. In the old system, the individual order quantities, or lot 
sizes, were typically based on a traditional economic order quantity 
(EOQ) formulation (Christopher, 1992; McCann, 1998). The EOQ 
model is based on the idea that it is possible to calculate order quantities/ 
shipment frequencies, involving minimal 'total logistics costs' (TLCs). 
These TLCs are the sum of the ordering/set-up costs, the costs of 
2 This paper does not prove that the logistical solutions reported in this article are perfectly 
optimal. However, the data do show that the companies have adopted the modern 
comprehensive logistics management principles and that their systems are at least less sub-
optimal than the systems organized on traditional Fordist principles. 
3 The criteria are arbitrary. Some authors reserve the term 'true JIT' for cases involving 
multiple deliveries a day (Morris, 1989; Morris, 1992). 
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holding inventories and the costs of transporting goods. The 
ordering/set-up costs included the administration costs involved in 
organizing an individual purchase, plus the labor costs involved in 
machinery set-up. The inventory holding costs were traditionally reduced 
to interest costs. The EOQ was derived by balancing these cost 
components.4  
 
The modern comprehensive logistics management principles that 
underlie JIT, involve a more inclusive interpretation of inventory holding 
costs. According to McCann (1998), compared to the traditional models, 
two extra cost factors are considered and are believed to represent a 
significant part of the inventory holding costs: space costs and total 
quality costs (TQCs).  
 
The space costs of inventory are the space and space handling costs of 
storage and warehouse space, comprising the land costs and the labor 
costs involved in inventory handling operations. The quality costs are the 
combined costs of lost market share due to poor quality and reliability of 
the final product and the costs of final quality control administration, 
which are the costs of expediting materials, the costs of lost orders, back-
orders, scrap and rejects. The greater the average volume of inventory 
held, the greater is the risk that faults in individual components will go 
undetected during the production process – the greater the quality costs.  
 
These cost components were not included in traditional Western 
purchasing techniques, which, as a consequence, underestimated the real 
costs of holding inventories. In other words the adoption of the 
comprehensive logistics management principles creates an incentive to 
further reduce the average volume of inventories by reducing the 
shipment size and increasing the shipment frequency. In modern quality-
competitive markets the significance of TQCs and space costs may be so 
4 The traditional formulation of the EOQ is expressed as 
Ic
mSQ 2*  , where *Q  is the 
economic order quantity, m  is the quantity of input per time period, S is the ordering/set-
up costs of conducting each individual shipment, I is the rate of interest and c  is the source 
price per unit of input (McCann, 1998). With his broader logistics costs model McCann 
(1996; 1998) shows how total input logistics costs are generally a positive function of 
transport costs and, thus, of distance. Correspondingly, the EOQ is dependent on transport 
costs and distance. Integration of this idea, and assuming shipment economies of scale, 
leads to the following formulation for the EOQ 
Ic
adSmQ ii
)(2*  , where a  is 
movement costs per mile and d is delivery distance. 
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great that the EOQ tends towards zero, i.e. lot sizes of one.5 However, if 
shipment sizes go down, and shipment frequencies go up, the transport 
cost and ordering/set-up cost components of the TLCs will rise. There 
are two ways this can be prevented. First, firms can work towards a 
reduction of the ordering/set-up costs of conducting each individual 
shipment, for example by streamlining the order entry system. Secondly, 
and more importantly for the present discussion, firms can attempt to 
reduce the input delivery distance. This is the basic logic behind the JIT-
proximity argument (Mair, 1992; McCann, 1996; McCann, 1998). 
 
The idea that there are forces that drive customer-supplier proximity is 
obviously not new. Even the traditional logistics models and the 
traditional way of calculating the EOQ could lead to a situation where 
the transport costs and the interest costs of holding inventories would 
drive customer-supplier co-location. In fact, one could consider buyer-
supplier co-location as the 'normal' situation. It is only because of issues 
such as differences in labor costs between locations, economies of scale 
in component production, and a whole range of reasons related to 
history, the technological capabilities of a region's suppliers and 
locational inertia, that customers use suppliers located in other regions. 
The difference with the comprehensive logistics management principles 
that underlie JIT is that the forces tending towards buyer-supplier 
proximity are stronger due to a greater appreciation of the role of space 
costs and TQCs.  
 
However, the specifics of the logistical arrangements and the effects on 
linkage distance remain dependent on a range of component 
characteristics and contextual conditions. Paraphrasing Christopher 
(1992), companies still have to make a range of 'trade-offs' in working 
towards the improvement of total supply chain cost effectiveness – the 
ultimate goal of any logistics system. Here we briefly consider the four 
issues which were investigated in the course of the study: differences in 
labor cost among production locations; value, volume and weight of 
components; minimum efficient scale of component production; and 
component variety. Other issues, notably superior technological 
capability and locational inertia will not be discussed since, because they 
were clearly less relevant for our case, they were not specifically 
addressed in the study. 
  
Labor cost differences among regions, as reflected in the price of 
components, are very important. More distant suppliers may be able to 
compete with lower prices because of cheaper labor costs. If these price 
                                                
5 Taking account of the space costs and TQC, the new formulation of the EOQ becomes: 
i
i
i Icsq
adSmQ 
 )(2* , where s is the logistics space cost coefficient and q expresses the 
impact of the TQC. Thus the higher the value of s and q the closer the EOQ will be to zero 
(McCann, 1998). 
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advantages outweigh the efficiencies gained by co-location, then a firm 
might operate JIT supply over longer distances (McCann, 1998) or 
operate logistics systems that diverge substantially from the prototypical 
true JIT system.  
 
Another oft-cited issue relates to the value and the bulk or weight of 
individual components. The incentive for increasing shipment frequency, 
decreasing order size and decreasing linkage distance will be greater for 
high value components than for low value components (Christopher, 
1992), ceteris paribus, since components with a high value will incur much 
higher interest and insurance costs. Likewise, the incentives for 
increasing shipment frequency and decreasing linkage distance are greater 
for physically bulky and heavy components than for small and light 
components, ceteris paribus (Lubben, 1988; McKinnon, 1997), since 
physically bulky components will incur higher space costs while the 
transport costs are higher for both physically bulky and heavy 
components.  
 
The minimum efficient scale of component production also impinges on 
the logistical arrangements and linkage distance. Production at minimum 
efficient scale often means that component manufacturers need to supply 
several customers, which can mean that suppliers are located at 
considerable distances from some of these customers (Bordenave and 
Lung, 1996; Jones and North, 1991; McKinnon, 1997; Milne, 1990; 
Morris, 1992; Schamp, 1991). 
 
Finally, the incentives for increasing the shipment frequency and 
proximity will be stronger for component categories involving a high 
variety of options (e.g. different colors or styles) than for more 
standardized component categories. This is because the greater the 
variety of options within a component category, the higher the inventory 
holding costs involved in stockpiling a certain level of finished 
components in all possible permutations (Christopher, 1992; van Hoek, 
1998; Bordenave and Lung, 1996), particularly in situations of highly 
unpredictable demand. Therefore, the greater the variety of options, the 
greater the incentive to delay the final assembly of component materials 
into finished components. The greater the delay in final assembly, the 
greater the shipment frequency, the greater the drive for buyer-supplier 
proximity.  
  
All these component characteristics and the difference in labor costs 
among regions mean that the adoption of comprehensive logistics 
management principles can have a variety of outcomes, involving both 
local and overseas sources and a combination of delivery methods 
(Lubben, 1988). At one end of the spectrum, the pipeline of some 
components will be organized along the lines of a true JIT system with 
suppliers located in close proximity to the customer. Because of technical 
developments in transport and logistics, even such a true JIT system does 
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not necessarily involve buyer-supplier co-location. Indeed, some 
companies have been reported to operate such systems with suppliers 
located in other countries or even other continents (Clarke and Beany, 
1993; Glasmeier and McCluskey, 1987; Lamming, 1993; McCann, 1998; 
Milne, 1990). However, these examples remain the exceptions. 
Frequency, distance, speed, reliability and the cost of transport are 
interrelated issues that have to be traded off against one another 
(McKinnon, 1997). In general, the literature suggests maximum workable 
distances for true JIT supply ranging from 30 to 150 miles (Estall, 1985; 
Kenney and Florida, 1992; Mair, 1992; Mair, Florida and Kenney, 1988; 
Sayer, 1986; Schoenberger, 1997). 
 
Alternatively, the adoption of comprehensive logistics management 
principles might lead to a "JIT-type" supply system (Crowley, 1996) 
involving slightly less frequent shipments and slightly higher buffer 
inventories and suppliers somewhat further away. In such instances, "the 
meaning of JIT delivery starts to change" (Lubben, 1988, p. 192). At the 
other end of the spectrum of outcomes, the pipelines of components 
might involve even less frequent shipments, still higher (though tightly 
managed) buffer inventory levels, and suppliers located at great distances 
(Fawcett and Birou, 1992). 
 
Geography of production linkages 
This section outlines the sources of the parts and components used by 
the 11 focal companies. Interviewees provided the names of their 
suppliers as well as the location of manufacturing. The precise detail of 
the geographical configuration of the supplier networks differed from 
company to company. However, great commonalities did exist, especially 
with respect to the regional supply situation. The main area of difference 
concerned the location of the motherboard/backpanel suppliers. The 
geographical origin of parts and components is summarized in Table 1. 
For more detailed data at individual company level, see: van Egeraat, 
Turok and Jacobson (1999) and van Egeraat, (2002). 
 
The vast majority of components and parts were imported from regions 
outside Ireland and Britain, notably from the Far East and, to a lesser 
extent, the USA. The only items characterized by significant sourcing in 
Ireland and/or Scotland were: enclosures, motherboards/backpanels 
(mainly from Scotland), network cards (from Ireland only), non-English 
language keyboards, digital/printed media, accessory kits 6 , 
cables/interconnect and packaging material. Furthermore, England and 
Wales figured to a small extent in the area of monitors while England 
played a role in the supply of motherboards as well. However, most of 
these components were imported from other regions as well. Thus, the 
majority of motherboards/backpanels, network cards, cables, keyboards  
                                                
6 Items such as media, mice, cables and connectors were typically packaged in a 'country' or 
'accessory' kit. Some focal companies had subcontracted the packaging of these kits to local 
supply-chain-managers that were also responsible for the sourcing of the items. 
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Table 1 Summary of Geographical Sources of Material Inputs of Focal 
Companies, 1998-1999 
 
Material input Main geographical sources* 
Enclosures and racks (high volume models) Mainly local and to a lesser extent Far 
East;   
Enclosures and racks (less current models); 
Screws, fasteners and other c-class items 
USA and, to a lesser extent, local  
Motherboards, backpanels and riser cards For most focal companies: Mainly Far 
East and, to a lesser extent, USA; For 
two focal companies: mainly Scotland 
and England  
Microprocessors Mainly South-East Asia, small amounts 
from Ireland; For proprietary 
technology: USA  
Floppy drives; CD-ROM drives; CD-RW 
drives; DVD drives; low-end technology 
high capacity disc and tape drives; Batteries 
and AC-adapter (for portables); Digital 
cameras; Hard disk drives; Speakers and 
microphones; Docking stations; 
Keyboards; mice; joysticks; low-end power 
supply; portable computers (contract 
manufacturing) 
Far East 
High-end high capacity disc and tape 
drives; high-end power supply 
USA, Far East, Europe and England 
Heatsinks; Cooling fans Mainly Far East;  to a lesser extent 
USA, England and Germany 
Modems and network components Mainly Far East and USA, although 
four suppliers were manufacturing in 
Ireland 
Graphics, video and sound cards; Printers; 
Other semiconductors; Capacitors and 
resistors; Memory 
Mainly Far East 
Cables and interconnect Mainly the Far East and, to a lesser 
extent, Ireland and Scotland. 
Displays Mainly Far East; Wales and England 
for few selected models.  
Media Printed manuals: mainly Ireland, and to 
a lesser extent Scotland; 
CD replication: Ireland, Scotland, 
Wales, Germany and USA; 
Wrapping of digital and printed media: 
local 
Accessory kits; Packaging material; Sub-
assembly and rework services; Printing of 
non-English language key-board models  
Local 
Complete computer systems (contract 
manufacturing) 
Mainly local, England and Taiwan;  
Etched boards; Interconnect, jumpers, 
switches 
Mainly Far East and USA 
 
* For the sake of brevity, much of the detail in this table has been omitted. For 
the complete table, please contact corresponding author. 
 
Source: Company interviews. 
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and monitors, were manufactured in other regions, notably in the Far 
East. Only enclosures, packaging, media, kits and non-English language 
keyboards were mainly sourced from suppliers in Ireland or Scotland. 
 
The local supply networks of the five microcomputer assemblers in 
Ireland included 47 (mainly foreign owned) companies operating 57 
component plants. The local supply networks of the six focal companies 
in Scotland included 49 (mainly foreign owned) companies operating 51 
plants. However, the actual production activities in many plants were 
very limited or added limited value to the product. Apart from limited 
digital printing activity, 11 kitting plants merely packaged media and 
other language specific parts into a box. Similarly, five keyboard 
localization plants merely laser printed (non-English language) keyboards 
manufactured overseas. Finally, the production activities of the turnkey 
suppliers involved in rework activities were of a very limited nature.  
 
Ten focal companies provided an estimate of expenditure on locally 
(Ireland or Scotland) manufactured components as a percentage of total 
expenditure. Figures were also provided for the share of components 
sourced in Ireland and Britain together. At the time the interviews were 
conducted, on average, ten per cent of the parts and components sourced 
by the focal companies in Ireland were manufactured in Ireland (ranging 
from seven to twelve per cent). The items manufactured in Britain were 
good for another four per cent on average (ranging from zero to nine per 
cent). As regards the focal companies in Scotland, on average seven per 
cent of the material inputs was manufactured in Scotland (ranging from 
two to nine per cent). The items manufactured in the rest of Britain and 
Ireland made up another nine per cent (ranging from three to ten per 
cent). 
 
The figures on local sourcing presented above are substantially lower 
than those presented in other studies, based on data collected by the 
industrial development agencies in Ireland and Scotland. Turok (1997) 
reports that in 1995 the 16 largest foreign owned electronics companies 
in Scotland (including all the main computer assemblers) sourced 21 per 
cent of their total purchases (excluding electronic components, inter-
company trading and services) from Scotland. In Ireland local sourcing 
figures are collected by Forfas as part of the annual Irish Economy 
Expenditure (IEE) survey. An extract of survey data on four 
microcomputer assemblers provided an average local sourcing figure of 
28 per cent for the year 1998 (van Egeraat, 2002). 
 
The discrepancy between the figures based on the surveys carried out by 
the industrial development agencies and our figures is partly explained by 
a less inclusive definition of local sourcing in our research. Thus, the IEE 
figures include expenditure on items bought from local supply-chain-
managers but manufactured in other regions as well as expenditure on 
complete systems manufactured by contract manufacturers with local 
279
operations. These items were not considered vertical production linkages 
and were excluded from the data collected during the company 
interviews. 
 
Inbound pipeline strategies and structures 
The focal companies had always had a mix of logistical arrangements. 
Before the mid-1990s, a small part of the inputs was manufactured and 
supplied on a virtually true JIT basis, involving minimal buffer 
inventories. In fact, Apple had implemented true JIT supply systems for 
selected components as early as 1983 (International Business Week, 14 May 
1984). However, the supply chains of most other components still 
involved larger buffer stocks, in most cases stored in customers’ 
warehouses as customer-owned inventory. These components were 
typically supplied on the basis of a push model, with vendors reacting to 
relatively inflexible purchase orders, detailing a fixed amount of product 
and a fixed delivery date on which customers had to accept the material. 
Supplies could either come direct from the suppliers' manufacturing 
facilities or be delivered via the suppliers' regional warehouses.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, the strategy of all focal companies has been shifting 
towards a 'hubbing' system. In a hubbing system, suppliers that are not 
able to supply their customers directly from their manufacturing facilities 
within a certain lead-time are requested to hold an agreed minimum 
amount of inventory at a location near to their customers – the 'hub'. On 
a very frequent basis, the customers pull from these hubs, either their 
exact material requirements or the amount necessary to replenish minimal 
on-site buffers. The suppliers have the responsibility for maintaining 
sufficient inventories in the hubs and hold title to these inventories. 
Customers only own the material from the moment they pull it from the 
hubs. Suppliers produce and deliver on the basis of very flexible purchase 
orders, often 'blanket purchase orders'.  
 
Some of the focal companies pulled material from a multitude of hubs, 
individually organized by the various suppliers, i.e. vendor hubs. 
However, there was an increasing trend to consolidate the hubbed 
inventories of multiple suppliers into one or two super hubs. This 
significantly reduced the complexity of the pull system. Some focal 
companies managed their own super hub. However, in most cases these 
super hubs were owned and managed by third-party-logistics (3pl) 
providers that offered integrated logistics services. These '3pl hubs' could 
serve several focal companies. 
 
Delivery lead-time requirements of individual focal companies varied 
from 24 hours to as low as one hour. Most 3pl hubs were therefore 
located close to the focal companies (see Figure 1) and some focal 
companies had organized hubbing facilities on-site. Such proximity 
allowed companies to pull materials multiple times a day, leading to 
extremely low inbound inventory levels on the books of the customers. It 
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is this hubbing system that partly explains the discrepancy between the 
use of overseas component sources and the high inventory turns 
published by some of the focal companies (Casey, 1997; Oram, 1997).  
 
Apart from hubbing, the focal companies still used a range of other 
pipeline structures, including true JIT. But most structures had one thing 
in common with the hubbing system: they involved locally stored 
inventories on the books of the suppliers. Thus, focal companies made 
increasing use of supply-chain-management companies that not only 
organized the logistics of components, but actually bought and held title 
to components until they were delivered to the assembly plants. Items 
sourced in this way could include many c-class items, cables and 
interconnect material, mice, keyboards and media. From an inbound 
logistics point of view there are great parallels between receiving supplies 
in this way and from a local hub. In both cases the customer pulls on a 
very frequent basis from agreed buffers located in close proximity and 
owned by the supplier/supply-chain-manager.  
 
In many cases local suppliers were requested to hold (at their own 
premises) minimum buffers of finished goods at levels similar to those 
requested from suppliers delivering through the hubs. Customers did not 
have to take the material and did not own it until the moment they pulled 
it from the local suppliers. Again, in those cases there was not that much 
difference between a hub and a local supplier.  
 
Through the hubbing system, and through most of the other pipeline 
arrangements, focal companies reduced their inbound inventories to a 
minimum by requesting suppliers to provide JIT deliveries from finished 
component inventories, stored in local warehouses. Such supply systems 
are typically referred to as 'apparent JIT' (Lamming, 1993; Ryan, 1997) or  
'pseudo JIT' (Hudson, 1994).  It has been suggested that these systems 
are sub-optimal and hold no benefit for the supply chain as a whole, 
since the costs of inventory remain in the system (Lamming, 1993). 
Suppliers are allegedly 'forced to eat inventories' (Morris, Munday, and 
Wilkinson, 1993; Roper, Prabhu, and van Zwanenberg, 1997) and the 
burden of inventory is simply transferred from the customers to the 
suppliers. However, the use of hubs, in itself, does not necessarily mean 
that the supply system is sub-optimal. The fact that the supply system 
diverges from the prototypical true JIT picture does not mean that the 
modern comprehensive logistics management principles are not 
appreciated. To determine this one requires data on the actual size of the 
inventories, the shipment frequencies and the mode of transport. These 
data are presented in the next section. However, additional information 
regarding the detail of the hubbing arrangements/contracts can already 
cast some light on the issue. 
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Figure 1 Location of Main Third Party Logistics Hubs in Ireland and 
Scotland – 1998/1999 
 
 
 
Source: Company interviews 
 
With regard to the idea of suppliers being forced to eat inventories, all 
but one of the interviewees indicated that suppliers were compensated 
for hubbing. Focal companies were paying more than the standard price 
for hubbed components. Furthermore, hubbing contracts could involve 
different liability clauses which meant that the risk of obsolescence was 
not always entirely transferred to the supplier. Thus although in the case 
of many components the focal companies were not liable to take the 
inventories in the hub at any stage, in other cases, particularly in cases of 
customised components, focal companies had to take the material in the 
pipeline after a certain period. Anyway, the risk of obsolescence of 
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hubbed materials was generally kept to a minimum by the intensive 
sharing of information regarding inventory data and demand forecasts.  
 
So if suppliers are compensated for maintaining inventories in the hubs 
and the focal companies have to bear the cost of inventories anyway, the 
question arises: what drives the rise of hubbing? There are several 
advantages of hubbing. First, a hubbing system, as opposed to a system 
where each individual focal company carries its own inventories, provides 
economies of scale in the management of industry standard inventories 
and allows total inventories to be reduced since inventories in the hubs 
can be, and are, switched between various focal companies. Secondly, 
most focal companies were extremely focussed on short-term 
performance indicators, such as return on investment, and hubbing 
allowed them to improve some of these indicators. As one interviewee 
put it: "[our company] is a public company … the first thing a Street 
analyst will look for is our inventory and our turns. Obviously this is a 
huge opportunity" (Interview Operations Manager, Gateway EMEA, 
1999).  
 
The use of 3pl hubs creates additional advantages over the use of vendor 
hubs. Both customers and suppliers can tap into the full set of integrated 
services offered by the 3pl providers. The bigger 3pl providers have 
developed or acquired core technologies and competencies in the area of 
logistics and supply-chain-management, notably sophisticated EDI, 
satellite tracking, radio-frequency scanning and automated customs 
handling systems.  
 
Logistical efficiency 
The focal companies imported the vast majority of components and parts 
from regions outside Ireland and Britain, notably from the Far East, and 
the pipelines of most components involved inventories, often hubbed in 
local warehouses. This section will investigate whether this situation 
reflects a sub-optimal inbound logistics system organized on traditional 
Fordist, Mass Production principles, or whether it came about in the 
context of a more efficient inbound logistics system, taking account of 
the modern comprehensive logistics management principles underlying 
JIT and TBC. 
 
The interviews with the focal companies made clear that the costs of 
holding inventories in the inbound pipeline were well appreciated in all 
focal companies. This was reflected in the high level of control focal 
companies kept over the inbound inventories and pipelines, as illustrated 
by the following quote. 
 
I give [the suppliers] my material requirements plan every 
week for that product and I expect them to manage the chain 
between them and the hub, I expect them to turn it up, down, 
slow it fasten it and manage it so that I always have 10 days 
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[worth of inventory] in the hub. … We run queries here every 
day by part number which sends out an exception report 
which shows me what suppliers have less than 10 days. And 
the buyers call them. And it also shows us what we have too 
much of. And we than proactively take actions twice a week. 
… All the vendors are on-line to Irish Express Cargo [the 3pl 
hub]. All the vendors have the same kind of contact. That is a 
criterion that Gateway gives (Interview Operations Manager, 
Gateway Ireland, Sept. 1999). 
 
In order to get an insight into how tightly the inbound inventories were 
managed, the focal companies were asked to provide a set of key logistics 
data for individual components from the various source regions. Table 2 
summarizes these data. The first column lists the various material inputs. 
With the exception of data on microprocessors and memory, no data are 
presented on the components for the board assembly lines. Only four 
focal companies were assembling limited amounts of printed circuit 
boards on site. The second column lists the target buffer or inventory 
levels (average for respondent companies) that companies tried to 
maintain for the various components. The data on target buffer levels 
represent buffers kept at hubs, suppliers' local/regional manufacturing 
facilities, warehouses of the focal companies, supply-chain-managers or 
at a combination of these facilities. The data do not include the (small) 
inventories kept at the plants of the focal companies in the context of 
hubbing or true JIT supply. In most cases the size of these on-site 
buffers was minimal. Finally, the third column lists the target number of 
days between shipments from the location of manufacturing into the 
main buffer (average for respondent companies). This is a measure of the 
shipment frequency. 
 
The key logistics data paint a picture of tightly managed inbound 
inventories with modest target buffer levels and high shipment 
frequencies. To some extent the target buffer levels for individual 
component pipelines varied, depending on a number of interrelated 
issues that will be discussed later in this section. However, all companies 
worked with a generic figure for target inbound inventory that applied to 
most parts and components. All but two focal companies worked 
towards a buffer of ten days (of forecasted demand) for most of their 
material inputs. One managed its inventories even more tightly, working 
towards a five day generic buffer level and applying a higher shipment 
frequency than other companies for most of its material inputs. The 
second worked towards a mixture of ten day and five day target buffer 
levels.  
 
Broken down by geographical origin, most components manufactured in 
the Far East and the Americas involved target buffers of between eight 
and ten days and shipment frequencies between weekly and bi-weekly 
(averages for respondent companies). For most materials from these 
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regions the typical mode of transport was plane7, leading to relatively 
small inventories caught up in transit and relatively small fluctuations in 
the actual inbound inventory levels. Most components manufactured in 
Europe again involved target buffer levels of between eight and ten days 
but shipments were more frequent – ranging from one to five times a 
week. All European material was trucked by road/ferry and the delivery 
lead-time was generally under 24 hours. 
 
Finally, regarding material inputs manufactured in the UK and Ireland, 
although a number of components involved very low target buffer levels 
– as low as two days (average for respondent companies) – most 
components involved buffer levels comparable to those applicable to 
items manufactured in other regions. Table 2 does not show shipment 
frequencies for locally sourced components since in most cases the main 
buffers were positioned at the suppliers' manufacturing facilities and fed 
directly from the manufacturing lines. Focal companies typically pulled 
materials from these suppliers on a daily basis, or even more frequently.8  
 
Where the main buffers were not positioned at the suppliers' 
manufacturing facilities, the hubs or the customers' facilities were 
typically supplied very frequently – often daily or every second day. The 
main exceptions included modem/network cards, which were typically 
shipped on a weekly or bi-weekly basis.  
 
Thus, the general picture is one of modest inbound target buffer levels 
and high shipment frequencies. 9  Although modest compared to the 
traditional Western logistics systems, these inbound target buffer levels 
were slightly higher than one would expect on the basis of 
comprehensive logistics management principles alone. The market 
conditions faced by the focal companies in combination with their 
production strategy provide an explanation for why the inbound buffer 
levels were in fact not less than optimal. 
 
                                                
7  Plane was the typical preferred mode of transport for the following items: 
microprocessors; memory; partly integrated portables; autoloaders; AC adapters; hard disk 
drives; CD ROM drives; Zip drives; sound, video and graphics cards; DVD drives; modem 
and network cards; motherboards; riser cards; mice; screws and fasteners. 
8  Thus, most enclosures, racks, heat sinks, configured hard-disk drives, and cables, 
manufactured in Ireland or the UK, were pulled on a daily basis or even more frequently, 
from buffers positioned at the suppliers. Similarly, country kits, wrapped media, non-
English language keyboards and packaging were generally pulled daily, or even more 
frequently, from very small (true JIT) buffers kept at the suppliers' premises. 
9 The figures should be compared to the traditional Western logistics systems during the 
1970s in which it was not uncommon for components like processors to be delivered every 
two or three months and to be transported by ship (personal communication, Dr. Philip 
McCann). 
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Table 2. Summary of Key Logistics Data (Averages for Focal Companies) 
 
Target 
buffer levels
(days) 
Target number 
of days between 
shipments 
Material inputs Far East and Americas   
Microprocessors 4 2 
Flat panel monitors 5 5 
Memory 8 3 
LCD displays 8 4 
Partly integrated portables 10 4 
Tape back-up/ autoloaders; AC adapter; Hard disk drives; 
CRT monitors; Small plastic metal parts; Floppy drive; CD 
ROM drive; CD RW drive; Combo drive; Zip drive; Docking 
stations; Joysticks; Scanner; Server racks; 
Sound/video/graphics cards; Power supplies; DVD drive; 
Modem/network cards; Enclosures; 
Motherboards/backpanels; English language keyboards; 
Printers; Enclosures for portables; Heat sinks; Microphone; 
Cooling fans; Riser cards 
8-10 5-10 
Battery for portable; Speakers; Mice; Power cables 13-14 6-10 
Other cables 15 11 
Screws and fasteners 35 40 
   
Material inputs Europe   
Power supplies 5 2 
m' boards/ backpanels 10 1 
CRT monitors; Tape back-up/ autoloaders; Memory; 
Enclosures for portables; Cooling fans; Hard disk drives; 
Other cables 
8-10 2-4 
Printers; Sound/video/graphics cards 10 5 
  
Material Inputs Ireland and UK   
Packaging; Non-English language keyboards; Country kits 2  
CD ROMs (wrapped); Printed media (wrapped) 4  
Heat sinks; Enclosures 5  
Hard disk drives; Server racks 6  
Small plastic metal parts; Modem/network cards; m' boards/ 
backpanels; Power supplies; CRT monitors; Printers; 
Flexcircuit 
9- 10 
 
Printed labels; Power cables; Other cables 13  
 
Source: Company interviews. 
 
All focal companies offered a great variety of product configurations, 
often customized to individual orders, in combination with extremely 
short order lead times – typically, the companies applied a target order 
lead time of less than five days. At the same time, the companies aimed 
to minimize the inventories of finished computer systems. These 
objectives are fully consistent with textbook TBC (Hise, 1995; Stalk and 
Hout, 1990). All focal companies addressed this combination of 
objectives with a build-to-order (BTO) production strategy for the 
majority of their output. The focal companies generally did not build 
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systems to stock. Instead, computer assembly activities usually only 
started after customer order receipt. 
 
The problem was that the focal companies were facing strongly 
fluctuating and unpredictable demand. In such an environment a BTO 
strategy in combination with very short lead times results in strongly 
fluctuating and unpredictable demand from final assembly on upstream 
functions. Although a JIT manufacturing system is designed to deal with 
small fluctuations in demand from final assembly, it cannot deal with 
highly fluctuating and unpredictable demand since this brings the danger 
of inefficient use of labor and machinery upstream and the build up of 
in-process inventories (Sayer, 1986). In the factories of the focal 
companies this problem was partly solved by a reduction of the number 
of separate phases in the production process. Production typically 
involved a very short uninterrupted sequence of system assembly, 
software downloading, testing and packing, with no in-process buffers. In 
a sense, the first upstream activity to be encountered was component 
production and that virtually all took place outside the boundaries of the 
plant, at the component suppliers. The problem of zero productivity of 
workers was addressed with numerical labor flexibility. 
 
However, as the first upstream function, the suppliers were confronted 
with a highly irregular and unpredictable sequence of pulls by the focal 
companies. In such a situation a virtual elimination of buffer inventories 
on the basis of the comprehensive logistics management principles would 
lead to an inefficient use of labor at the suppliers or an increased risk of 
stock-out. A BTO production system with short order lead times in an 
environment of erratic final demand simply requires certain buffers 
between the suppliers and the manufacturing lines of the customer, 
except in situations of extremely short manufacturing cycles at the 
suppliers. All this is totally consistent with the comprehensive logistics 
management principles underlying JIT and TBC. In effect, the focal 
companies were simply trading-off the costs of inbound pipeline 
inventories against the loss of market share and revenue due to stock-
out.10 
 
This partly explains why in many cases the supply pipelines of 
components manufactured in Ireland, the UK and Europe involved 
similar target buffer levels to those that applied to inputs manufactured 
in the Far East or the Americas. Many of these components involved 
target buffer levels of between five and ten days. A number of items 
manufactured in Ireland or the UK tended to involve lower target buffer 
levels of (finished) components. However, in most of these cases the 
suppliers involved were committed to holding the balance of the generic 
target levels in the form of unfinished or non-configured components 
                                                
10 A similar challenge of combining JIT principles, global sourcing and BTO production for 
a volatile market has been described in an article on the logistics operations at Bose's 
speaker plant in the USA (Bradley, 1989). 
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while the final assembly or configuration process was made extremely 
short. 
 
For example, four focal companies that received hard disks from 
Quantum in Ireland worked towards relatively low target levels of fully 
configured/pre-assembled hard disks. However, Quantum was 
committed to holding the balance of the ten days generic target buffer 
level in non-configured form, while the configuration cycle was very 
short and added minimal value. Three other focal companies applied the 
generic target buffer levels for finished hard disks.  
 
To reiterate, there is abundant evidence that the inbound inventories and 
logistics pipelines were tightly managed. What can also be shown is that 
the impact of contextual conditions and component characteristics on 
the way companies managed their inbound logistics and the geography of 
the supply linkages was in line with the comprehensive logistics 
management principles. In the following paragraphs we show the 
empirical importance of the four main issues we introduced at the 
theoretical level above. It is essential to note that in all cases the eventual 
outcome was the result of a complex trade-off among a variety of 
component characteristics and contextual conditions. The eventual 
outcome therefore does not always directly reflect the importance of an 
individual factor. Moreover, the characteristics of some components, 
notably monitors, were such that companies had a choice of different 
supply-chain solutions, any one of which would have been equally 
efficient.  
 
Regional differences in labor costs: These remained a strong force against a 
reduction of the linkage distance. Interviewees stated that producers in 
other regions, particularly in the Far East, could offer material inputs at a 
substantially lower price than producers in Ireland or the UK. This was 
mainly due to far lower wage rates and high flexibility of the labor force, 
while currency exchange rates played an important role as well. To attain 
total supply chain cost effectiveness companies balanced the efficiencies 
in logistics gained by using local suppliers against material cost price 
advantages gained by using suppliers in low-wage regions. In many cases 
the more efficient solution involved suppliers located in the Far East. 
 
It [the reason for not sourcing monitors locally] is basically an 
argument between the actual unit cost and the actual 
component part in terms of labor content, etc.  So if labor 
content is a high proportion of the unit cost then it makes 
sense to manufacture that in a low labor cost arena. … So 
you take into account the differential between labor content 
and the actual transport cost, your [inventory] financing 
costs, and money while on the sea, etc., etc. (Interview 
Logistics Manager, Apple Computer Ireland, Dec. 2000). 
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Value, volume and weight of components: Also in line with the comprehensive 
logistics management principles was the fact that the inventories of 
components with a high unit value were most tightly managed. As 
regards material inputs manufactured in the Far East and the Americas, 
the inventories of high value microprocessors, flat panel monitors and 
memory tended to be managed most tightly (see Table 2). For example, 
on average the focal companies and their suppliers worked towards 
microprocessor inventory levels that fluctuated between four and six 
days. The high value of these components led to a higher shipment 
frequency, which should theoretically increase the tendency towards 
proximity. However, this force towards proximity was simply outweighed 
by the labor cost savings and exchange rate advantages involved in 
producing these items in the Far East in combination with the relatively 
low costs involved in transporting these items frequently by air. On the 
other hand, the inventories of items with a low unit value such as mice, 
cables, screws and printed labels incurred limited inventory holding costs 
and were managed least tightly.  
 
The effect of bulkiness of individual components is most clearly 
illustrated by packaging material. Packaging material, although of low unit 
value, required much warehouse space, thereby incurring extremely high 
inventory holding costs. Therefore, packaging tended to be sourced 
locally on a true JIT basis involving buffer levels of less than one to two 
days and one or more shipments a day. In this case the characteristic of 
bulkiness weighed stronger than the characteristic of low unit value, 
resulting in true JIT supply.  
 
The bulkiness and weight of the components also had a more indirect 
effect on the logistics management and the geography of the supply 
linkages – via their implications for the mode of transport. Most material 
inputs manufactured in the Far East or the Americas were typically 
transported by plane leading to low in-transit inventories and low 
fluctuations in the target buffer inventories. Companies mentioned 
transit times typically ranging from three to five days including time lost 
at customs authorities on both sides. However, airfreight rates rise 
steeply for components with a high physical volume or weight with the 
result that for many components airfreight is simply not an option on a 
continuous basis.  
 
The alternative was ocean freight. The downside of ocean freight is that, 
compared to airfreight, it involves substantial in-transit inventories. 
Companies typically mentioned transit times of four to five weeks in the 
case of ocean freight from the Far East and two to three weeks from the 
USA. Furthermore, ocean freight involves larger fluctuations in the actual 
inbound inventory levels than airfreight, even though the target buffer 
levels might be similar. In spite of these downsides, for many 
components with lower value-to-weight or value-to-volume ratios the 
outcome of the trade-off of all factors was sourcing in the Far East and 
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shipment by sea. Thus, power supplies, cooling fans, heat sinks, CRT 
monitors, keyboards, joysticks, microphones, scanners, speakers, printers, 
power cables and enclosures sourced in the Far East were typically 
transported by ship. The downsides of ocean freight were reduced by 
using different ocean-freight services, offering a range of transit times, 
and by the occasional use of airfreight services.  
 
In other cases, the combination of component characteristics and 
regional labor cost differences / exchange rate advantages led to the use 
of local or regional suppliers. For example, most focal companies 
sourced enclosures from local suppliers.11 Sourcing bulky enclosures in 
the Far East incurred high inventory holding costs due to the space costs 
of local warehousing and high in-transit inventories associated with ocean 
freight. This strong force for proximity was not offset by the labor cost 
savings associated with production in the Far East. 
 
Minimum efficient scale (MES) of component production: This does explain some 
of the detail in the geographical configuration at a national and regional 
level. Components such as country kits, packaging and a service like 
keyboard localization can be produced or offered efficiently at a relatively 
low scale that requires only one customer. This allowed suppliers to set 
up relatively small operations in very close proximity to individual 
customers, often in the same town or city. The production of 
motherboards, monitors, enclosures and higher-end technology 
components, involves a higher minimum efficient scale that requires a 
level of business that can exceed that offered by one or a few individual 
microcomputer companies. As a result, the larger operations of these 
suppliers tended to be located at greater distances from at least some of 
their customers, often in a different country on the British Isles.   
 
Component variety: The variety of options per component category was a 
relevant issue as well. The research showed that the components with a 
high variety of options – country kits, shrink-wrapped media, non-
English language keyboard models and the customer configured hard 
disk drives of Quantum – were indeed produced on a true JIT or virtually 
true JIT basis, generally by local suppliers. Holding standard target buffer 
levels of these components in all their possible configurations and 
languages would greatly increase the inventory holding costs. The local 
supplier facilities were involved in the delayed or postponed final 
assembly or configuration activities, while they were generally committed 
                                                
11 A number of companies imported their volume enclosure models from the Far East. The 
reason for this lay in the relatively limited volumes required – volumes that did not warrant 
the costs of developing a local source and the cost of a second tool. Two of the companies 
that used imported enclosures were in the process of contracting a local supplier. Less 
current enclosure models and server racks were often imported from the USA. Again, the 
reason was that the volumes involved did not warrant the development of a second source 
locally. 
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to holding higher buffer levels of unfinished or non-configured 
components, often produced in other regions. 
 
Clearly, component characteristics, regional differences in labor costs, 
and exchange rate changes affected the way companies managed their 
inbound logistics and the geography of the supply linkages. In many 
cases these characteristics led to logistics systems that diverged 
substantially from the prototypical true JIT system. However, in all cases 
the divergences were totally consistent with the comprehensive logistics 
management principles. 
 
Conclusion 
Schoenberger (1997) believes that after the era of Fordist mass 
production, that lasted until the mid-1970s, the capitalist world entered a 
new era of TBC. She argues that this transition will lead to a new 
geography of production, a kind of concentrated deconcentration 
organized around geographically coherent multinational market regions. 
One aspect of this model is the idea that the increased focus on reducing 
order-to-delivery cycles and logistical efficiency will lead to a greater 
proximity between buyers and their suppliers and an increase in the local 
and regional production linkages. The relevance of this idea has been 
tested in a case study of the microcomputer hardware industry in Ireland 
and Scotland. 
 
It was shown that the microcomputer assemblers imported the vast 
majority of components and parts from regions outside Ireland and 
Britain, notably from the Far East, and that the pipelines of most 
components involved inventories, often hubbed in local warehouses. 
Some have interpreted such supply systems as apparent JIT or pseudo 
JIT, a sub-optimal inbound logistics system organized on traditional 
Fordist, Mass Production principles. We have argued that the logistics 
systems and the geography of the supply linkages were not sub-optimal. 
The necessary inbound inventories were tightly managed leading to 
modest target buffer levels and high shipment frequencies. By sourcing 
from the Far East, companies were simply trading-off price advantages 
gained by using suppliers in low-wage regions against the efficiencies in 
logistics gained by using local suppliers, totally consistent with the 
modern comprehensive logistics management principles underlying JIT 
and TBC. Similarly, the effects of various component characteristics were 
consistent with what could be expected on the basis of the 
comprehensive logistics management principles. 
 
The inbound inventory levels were slightly higher than one would expect 
on the basis of comprehensive logistics management principles alone. 
However, we have shown that this was not indicative of a sub-optimal 
supply chain solution. Rather, the main reason for the slightly higher 
levels lay in the BTO production strategies of the focal companies. 
Clearly, the modern comprehensive logistics management principles 
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underlying JIT and TBC can lead to supply systems that diverge 
substantially from the prototypical true JIT system. 
 
What are the lessons for industrial development policy in Ireland and 
Scotland? Industrial policy and the strategies of the industrial 
development agencies in Ireland and Scotland have long included the 
idea of building integrated vertical production clusters around 
subsidiaries of MNEs (Industrial Policy Review Group, 1992; Turok, 
1997). This can be called the “local sourcing route” to cluster 
development (Young, Hood and Peters, 1994, p. 669). The findings of 
this research suggest that such a strategy is becoming increasingly 
unsuitable, at least in the context of the microcomputer industry.  
 
The suitability of a strategy of building integrated clusters around 
subsidiaries of MNEs in the microcomputer assembly industry might well 
become of theoretical interest only since Ireland and Scotland have 
recently experienced a wave of plant closures and job losses in the 
microcomputer assembly industry. During the 1980s and most of the 
1990s Ireland and Scotland were important locations for computer 
assembly activity. Supplying the European market with build-to-order, 
often customized, bulky and relatively valuable systems with short order 
lead times required a production location in Europe. Within Europe, 
Ireland and Scotland offered the required combination of relatively low 
wages (on a European scale), flexible labor markets, and literate and 
trainable labor forces. In terms of Schoenberger’s (1997) model of 
concentrated deconcentration, both countries functioned as the “new 
semi-periphery” of Europe. 
 
The situation started to change during the second half of the 1990s. 
Wage rates in Ireland and Scotland were rising rapidly. At the same time, 
Eastern Europe was progressively opening up for capitalist economic 
activity, which created new production locations, offering low wages and 
a relatively skilled labor force, at a short distance from, and soon to 
become part of, the EU market.  
 
As a result, since 1998, much system assembly activity has been shifting 
to Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic and Hungary 
(van Egeraat and Jacobson, 2004). This shift of assembly activity, in 
combination with a competition-induced shakeout of branded 
microcomputer makers, has led to a serious reduction in microcomputer 
assembly activity in Ireland and Scotland. Of the original five focal 
companies operating in Ireland in 1998, by 2003 only Dell and Apple 
were still assembling microcomputers, and Apple’s system assembly 
operation was substantially downsized. Similarly, of the six original focal 
companies in Scotland, only Sun, Packard Bell-NEC, IBM and 
Compaq/HP were still assembling systems by 2003 and IBM and 
Compaq/HP had significantly downsized their assembly operations while 
Packard Bell-NEC was planning to close its plant. The reduction of 
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computer assembly activity resulted in further job-losses in the 
component sector, notably in plants producing the bulky enclosures that 
had always required relative proximity to the system assemblers. 
 
Clearly a strategy of building integrated vertical clusters around 
manufacturing subsidiaries of MNEs does not look very promising in the 
context of Ireland and Scotland. The alternative route identified by 
Young, Hood and Peters (1994, p. 669) is via “technological innovation”. 
Here, technological cluster development might be stimulated through co-
operative R&D projects involving companies, university research labs 
and government research institutions. This appears to be the more 
appropriate route for Ireland and Scotland to take. Both IDA Ireland and 
Scottish Enterprise have indeed adopted elements of such a strategy. 
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